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Abstract 
 
The conception of society as a pyramid is strongly rooted and spread over the 
different world cultures that it could be considered as “universal” in the sense 
given by E.Reclus. The current world geopolitical structure (the world order) 
is transforming according to hierarchical-elitarian principles in economy, 
hierarchical flexibility or authority in conformity with the various social 
cultures, and (but only as a “noble” fiction) in accordance with the Western 
idealistic equalitarian-participating principles. It is taking on a shape of a 
world order at the same time Ultracentered, Pluricentered and Intercentered, 
depending from the level (or part) of the hierarchy/pyramid of power you are 
considering. 
 
Keywords: World Order. Hierarchy (of power). Governance (kinds of) 
Centrality. Change (in the World Order). (different) Selecting criteria. 
 
 
Resumen 
 
El concepto de la sociedad como pirámide se arraiga y extendió  fuertemente 
por las diversas culturas del mundo de tal modo que podría ser considerado 
como “universal” en el sentido dado por E.Reclus. La estructura geopolítica 
del mundo actual (la orden del mundo) está transformándose según 
principios jerárquicos-elitistas en economía, flexibilidad jerárquica o autoridad 
conforme a las varias culturas sociales, y (pero solamente como ficción 
“noble”) de acuerdo con los principios participativos-igualitarios de los 
idealistas occidentales. Está adquiriendo la forma de una orden al mismo 
tiempo Ultracentrada, Pluricentrada e Intercentrada del mundo, dependiendo 
del nivel (o de la parte) de la jerarquía/de la pirámide de poder que está 
sendo considerada. 
 
Palabras-clave: Orden del mundo. Jerarquía del poder. Clases de gobierno. 
                                                           
1 Paper published in the Proceedings of the International Symposium.“Centrality and the 
World-System”. 26–28 April 2000 — Bordeaux (France). Fabrizio Eva. www.fabrizio-eva.info 
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Centralización. Cambio en la orden del mundo. Diferentes criterios selectivos. 
 
 
 
Título: O poder é o pivô da história 
 
 
Introduction 
 
Current world dynamics display several empirical indicators that 
demonstrate that there has been a world order for some time and that it is 
still working. 
The main feature of the world order—and an accepted ideological 
concept—is the inequality of power, and therefore of action and rights, 
between states. The asserted equality of states under the Westphalian 
system is a “functional fiction” (Eva 1999); the reality is a hierarchical–
pyramidal structure (Agnew and Corbridge 1995; Strange 1997) that 
operates under the global governance of a few empowered nations and 
international organisms influenced by the “Holy Alliance” of these same 
nations (Zolo 1995; Falk 1999). 
There are four key principles to the operation of the world order: 
stability, territorial containment of conflicts, economic globalization, and 
Western-style democracy (Eva 1999). 
The deterritorialization of the state, the changing roles and functions of 
international borders, and challenges to the absolute sovereignty of states 
and their territories are emblematic of the current process of change 
(Newman 1999). But the concept of nation remains very strong and is still 
the standard unit of measurement in our conception of national interests, 
geostrategy, and international relations. The term inter[-]national itself 
stresses the centrality of the nation. 
The power pyramid is not regarded as fixed since “geopolitics is about 
change” (Dalby 1999). Rather, I assume that while the pyramidal structure is 
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the norm in a hierarchical world order, the relative position and role of the 
individual nations within the pyramid changes through time. Even if we agree 
with Dalby that “sovereign states are cartographic devices”, the world order 
is still based on nations in the sense that the global decision-makers belong 
to the ruling classes of specific states with specific characteristics. They are 
empowered by territorial justifications, although they act in an increasingly 
deterritorialized way. The elite “aim to maintain their state and its apparatus 
in order to retain or increase their own power” (Paasi 1999). 
Finally, international relations are usually described through “state 
narratives.” 
 
A World Order still working 
 
USA are “at the top of the hill” and the states at the apex of the 
pyramidal world order belong to or have a leading role in organisms like UN 
Security Council, G7, IMF, World Bank, NATO, EU. They can be described in 
terms of their: 
1)  geographic conditions 
2) control of financial flows and the nodes of the world economy 
3) political role on the world stage 
4) national self-esteem and desire for power 
 
1) Although territory is less important today than in the past, the world order 
is still based on it, since it determines the borders of states and the 
geographic differentiation between them. In a world order based on 
territory, the area, population, availability of resources, and geographic 
location of a state are still significant. It is not possible for a state to be a 
(super)power unless it has territory or the capacity to control territory 
(power and/or military efficiency are significant in this sense). The 
progressive decline in importance of territory in a globalized world can be 
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countered by the capacity to control economic dynamics. 
2) The globalization of economies and the media occurs irrespective of 
territory. Globalization challenges the very idea of the nation-state since it 
threatens certain typical characteristics (borders, for example) and 
reduces the potential for exclusive action within a state’s own territory. 
This undermines the concept of sovereignty itself. 
3) The political role of a state on the world stage depends on its past and 
present—that is, on overall long-term dynamics and the dynamics (often 
unforeseeable) of the moment. These determine the likelihood of states 
becoming leaders. 
4) It is not possible for a state to become a (super)power if there is no will to 
do so and if the political leaders and the people themselves do not have 
strong self-esteem built in as a cultural rather than a national trait. In an 
international power structure based on inequality, thinking and acting as if 
one were more or better than others is unavoidable. This self-esteem is 
the product of a protracted historical–cultural process that often manifests 
itself in the geostrategic decisions of the world powers. Success or failure 
in reaching objectives is mainly the result of the condition of/capacity for 
controlling historical dynamics while they are in progress. 
In the past, cohesive societies with strong symbolic points of 
reference and a determined elite were able to employ a geostrategy based 
on control. And today these factors are still effective: the blurring of social 
cohesion and strong symbols can be integrated with, or replaced by, 
cultural and ideological control deriving from the command of the media 
and advanced technologies or even by the capacity to invent symbols and 
identity narratives. 
Writers commenting on international relations, strategy, or the 
foreign policies of the main powers refer to the nation–population using 
expressions such as “national interests,” a “will to pursue national strategy” 
(Cline 1975), and “national morale” (Spanier 1993). One particular 
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supporter of property-based analysis explicitly states that the 
“cohesiveness of owner identity is the source of community resolve” 
(Demarest 1998), underlining the geopolitical importance of being 
“resolute.” I prefer the term self-esteem (as a historically and socially 
constructed, and therefore cultural, characteristic), which suggests more 
the idea of an attitude shared by the majority of a population. The term 
therefore represents “national” sentiment as the sum of the attitudes of a 
country’s population rather than an ideology passed down from on high. 
For this reason I would argue that among the factors that influence 
the world order, the dominating cultural make-up of the nation-states at 
the top of the pyramid should be taken into account, in particular as 
regards the nature of their relationships with power and the perception 
they have of themselves (self-esteem). If geographic differences continue 
to be relevant, so to do cultural differences, and this must be taken into 
account. Cultural areas have differing abilities at dealing with political and 
economic dynamics at the local and global levels. They are not, however, 
necessarily in conflict with each other. The only states that are in 
competition (or in conflict) with one another are those that compete for 
world power and/or an authoritative role on the international stage. Local 
conflicts or bilateral wars that do not threaten the status quo have no 
relevance within the general structure, and the so-called international 
community relies on them remaining territorially confined. 
The international “rules of the game” and the hierarchical world order 
are (still) determined by mechanisms and concepts originating in, and created 
by, the West, and it is not by chance that at the apex of the pyramid we find 
(and have for some time) countries with Western cultures. 
A significant empirical indicator of power is the capacity to abuse it—
that is, a readiness not to respect (international) rules or customs and to 
bend the rules without consequences. The countries at the apex of the world 
order have all shown this readiness, although in significantly different ways. 
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China and Japan have aspirations to a role of authority, if not one of true 
leadership, and are the only non-Western countries at the apex of the world 
order. It must first be stated that China is already in a position where it can 
bend the rules or fail to respect internationally accepted regulations or 
customs, while Japan is still forced to endure restrictions to its geopolitical 
actions and, therefore, is not in a position to play outside the rules. 
 
A “mentally” accepted hierarchy 
 
The inevitability and naturalness of hierarchy is a cultural construct that 
has been consolidated over such a long period that for most humans it is 
impossible (initially) to envisage the absence of some center, some form of 
hierarchical power, as the only valid instrument for guaranteeing the order 
and security of any human community. This attitude is the product of the 
fatalistic acceptance of the inequality of humans. It is behind the widespread 
confusion between inequality and difference. 
The exercising of some power in some form is inevitable in relations 
between individuals and groups. This does not automatically mean, however, 
that one cannot live without power or that one cannot conceive the absence 
of power in the life of a society. In the modern era, socio-political Utopias 
have been envisaged in which power is deliberately fragmented and 
destructured so as to humanize it, that is, to place it within reach of the 
individual. Anarchic thought has provided the most extreme and highly 
structured examples of such visions. 
Before the modern age, power was structured into various hierarchical 
forms according to the philosophical and economic views of the day. In the 
modern age, the push for the “democratic” broadening of the participation of 
the social classes and citizens in public life—and therefore in power—has 
produced a view of the state as the modern power structure. The state 
compensates for inequality/difference between individuals through its 
 Ágora, Santa Cruz do Sul, v. 13, n. 2, p. 43-57, jul./dez. 2007 
 
50 
superior structure, which is theorized—or won through social and political 
conflict—as being increasingly “neutral” as regards the choice of the individual 
and the particular identities of its citizens. This is the case in Europe and the 
West in general. 
“The other face of hierarchy is inequality” (Held 1999), but since 
inequality is regarded as natural, it produces a positive value as regards 
order, all the more so if it is democratic.  
The modern state uses various forms of centrality and hierarchy—the 
product of various cultural traditions—to guarantee an order that today, at 
least in the West, we desire to be “democratic.” It should be pointed out that 
at present the objective of clear economic genesis and efficiency seems to be 
increasingly regarded as an indicator of democracy, rather than a means to 
particular ends that are privately determined.  
At the time the nation-state was being established, conceptual 
definitions of the type developed by Friedrich Ratzel, for example, regarding 
the indissoluble state–land–population triangle were useful, as opposed to 
necessary: the “container” must have a form (the state), clear dimensions 
(territory with clear-cut borders), and a content clearly related to it (the 
people). This triangle represents a vital organism. It is no surprise that 
theories about the organic state, such as those of Ratzel (1897) or Halford 
Mackinder (1904) that spoke of the need for territorial control (Heartland) as 
the geostrategic aim of power, were so readily accepted in academic circles 
and by political decision-makers during the age of colonialism and industrial 
and economic imperialism around the turn of the last century. 
Later views of international relations and strategies were founded on 
nothing more than extending the concept of state-based order, power, and 
sovereignty to a larger territory (the world) politically based on associations 
of sovereign states that, in the future, will be governed as a universal state. 
The current geopolitical situation (the world order) involves existing 
states that occupy particular places in a hierarchy with recognized territorial 
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sovereignty (although under threat from economic globalization), which have 
changeable, fast-moving, and deterritorialized dynamics.  
Despite differences in circumstances and mechanisms, there is no 
conflict between states and economic dynamics at the level of ideals. Indeed, 
states have protected and guided economic dynamics and continue to benefit 
from doing so. “States are in agreement as to how to act to encourage 
economic globalization” (Sassen 1998). 
The overlapping interests of the political and economic elite are obvious 
given that the management of the economy and economic activities is 
ideologically hierarchical and centralized at the level of decision-making 
authority, geared towards efficiency (the pursuit of one’s own aims), and 
“democratic” in the sense that it is flexible and does not present a priori 
ideological obstacles to entering global competition, although the global 
market is composed of selected players that are not democratic in 
themselves—in the economic system, the only “voters” are those with capital 
(Sassen 1998). 
Every enterprise is founded on the principle of property. Decision-
making power is directly proportional to the amount of this property. The 
spaces within an enterprise are exclusive, subject to security checks, and 
organized according to a hierarchical–functional chain. The roles and activities 
of the humans within the enterprise are unequal in terms of titles, 
responsibilities, and remuneration. “The moment citizens entered factories, 
their lives became subject to the dictates of capital” (Held 1999). 
The space outside an enterprise—that is, public space—belongs to the 
state and its citizens. But again this space is conceptually hierarchical 
because there is a desire for it to be “ordered” rather than “organized,” even 
if the need to negotiate is recognized. However, the universal rights of the 
citizen to participate in the political process and the existence of multiple 
decision-making centers draws out the time required to make decisions and 
even involves the discussion or criticism of the premises legitimizing authority 
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itself. This is not acceptable for the private citizen who has decision-making 
authority. It is no surprise that business people are increasingly insisting that 
the public authorities speed up and streamline the decision-making process. A 
commonly held belief in the business community is that the state should 
restrict economic intervention as much as possible (Nozick, 2000), and that 
any intervention that does occur should be “democratic” in the sense that it 
must guarantee the right to possess property. From the perspective of 
capitalist democracy, property and “opportunities” are sufficient guarantee of 
socio-economic mobility fuelled by competition. 
By virtue of these premises, the world order is generally seen according 
to the traditional hierarchical–pyramidal power structure. In the current 
geopolitical phase, the hegemonic states are mainly interested in governance 
(the steering of trends and the mild regulation of the imbalances of economic 
crisis and conflict) and security (the maintenance of the existing structure 
and, possibly, hegemony). 
 
Different kinds of “centrality” 
 
Reassessing the world order in light of the above considerations, we can 
state that the hierarchical power pyramid, which has been a pivot of history 
from time immemorial, is still operating, although contemporary challenges 
have fragmented its operation. 
Current trends can be summed up as follows: 
1. “Universal” values are progressively ultra-centralized—that is, they are 
increasingly reduced in scope to their Anglo-American interpretation within 
Western politico-theoretical culture (parliamentary democracy, human 
rights, unlimited ownership). The emergence of China as an international 
player may challenge this situation. 
2. The problems of international security (the fight against terrorism) and 
stability (the maintenance of the status quo, territorial containment of 
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conflicts, “humanitarian” military intervention) are increasingly 
centralized. This trend also holds true for technology and the media. 
3. Capital flows and economic hubs, in particular financial, are already pluri-
centric, although hierarchical. Because of changes in transport, this is 
also true of manufacturing. 
4. International aid, disaster relief, and so on take place in many centers, 
although UN bodies do act to some extent as centralized points of 
reference. 
 Hierarchically organized power remains the main reference point in the 
world order. It is rigid in that it is structured, multifaceted in that it has a 
range of functions, and flexible in that it allows states internal mobility 
according to their circumstances. 
  
Conclusion 
 
Anyone who wishes to make real changes to the world geopolitical 
structure must be capable of envisaging something that is truly different, 
something that would change the conceptual reference points—that is, 
something other than power and its hierarchical–pyramical structure. But 
there must also be a desire to change. 
Over the last two decades, and in particular since the end of the bipolar 
world order, such visions have increasingly taken the form of theoretical 
propositions (neo-Marxism, post-modernism) lying outside the traditional 
liberal-capitalism/Marxism dichotomy. Globalization, which has a 
progressively homogenizing effect since it is promulgated by the media and 
new technologies, as well as the lack of disagreement among “realists” in the 
area of international politics and among the Anglo-American libertarians2 in 
                                                           
2 In Europe, the term libertario means anarchist. In Italy, however, certain political 
movements have begun to use the term incorrectly to mean libertarian. This meaning is now 
passing into general use. 
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the area of economics have given impulse to the rediscovery of so-called 
communitarian liberalism, which, although certainly in the democratic mold 
(Selznick, 1999) and suffering from the limitations of its geographic and 
conceptual origins (yet again in the Anglo-Saxon world), does find support 
among those who defend cultural tradition as the best resistance to a 
supposed single globalized way of thinking. It should be pointed out that 
telecommunications and information technology are making it increasingly 
easy for individuals in affluent societies to either lock themselves up in their 
own immediate space or immerse themselves in cyberspace. What the 
consequences of this might be at the level of power and the exercising of 
power is among the most important, topical, and complex areas of 
geopolitical study.   
Some theories have been more directly addressed at the reform (the 
re-ordering) of the world system, including the WOMP (World Order Models 
Project) and Daniele Archibugi’s and David Beetham’s writings regarding a 
cosmopolitical democracy. Ideas of this type have the merit of tackling the 
question of the central role of power in history and its hierarchical 
repercussions in the structuring of an order. Their main objective is to 
conceptually alter the interpretive framework. On the whole, rather than 
concepts based on hegemony, they put forward key concepts that aim to 
resolve conflicts and organize cooperative relations.   
These concepts can be summarized as follows: 
1. The de-ethnicized, deterritorialized individual belonging to a range of 
groups (a concept deriving from the cosmopolitical citizen of the world 
[from Immanuel Kant through Martha Nussbaum 1999]) 
2. The multi-territoriality of human groups, with mobile (Reclus 1905) and 
flexible borders, multiple accords of various dimensions (Malatesta 1924), 
and the multiplication of borders (Eva 1992) 
3. The deideologization of spaces and people’s ties to it (Falk 1999) 
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4. The division (fragmentation) of global and regional power, and of the 
bodies that wield it (Archibugi 1998) 
These concepts are decidedly at odds with the hegemonic model that 
currently operates. However, they (with exclusion of point 2) suffer from two 
fundamental defects: 
• They are to some degree dependent on the idea of the state (they do not 
succeed in not thinking in terms of it) and the idea that power must in 
some way be structured. 
• While criticizing the economic system (which is also hierarchical), they do 
not concern themselves with changes to economic and production 
structures, which remain the prerogatives of power. 
Finally, it should be pointed out that such arguments use concepts and 
reasoning that are typical of anarchic thought, without their authors being 
aware of the fact (at least it seems so). This is the result of the systematic 
dismissal and negation through history of anarchism exercised by bourgeois 
thought, because of fear, and Marxist thought, because of anarchism’s 
practical incompatibility with the Marxist idea of “revolution” and Marxists 
wishing to avoid any competition in the area of left-wing thought. 
Nevertheless, this road has been taken and we can now look forward with a 
certain optimism to future theoretical developments. 
Elisée Reclus believed he had identified three factors in human 
development: “Class struggle, the pursuit of equilibrium, and the sovereignty 
of the individual’s decision-making rights—these are the three factors that the 
study of social geography reveals and that, in the chaos of things, show 
themselves to be sufficiently constant to be called laws” (Reclus 1905, p. iv). 
These “laws” or constants in human history indicate that: 
1. In all societies there has been, and still is, the tendency for organization 
into groups according to class and caste. 
2. There is an unstoppable tendency towards the balancing out of inequalities 
and an ongoing balancing out between power and freedom. 
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3. No evolution can occur within a population without individual effort. 
Using these three concepts as interpretive reference points offers significant 
scope for geopolitical analysis and sufficient room for thought to envisage a-
centric ways of organizing society. 
Reference to the individual and the reduction of the dynamics of power to the 
astructured level of the individual, as well as positive assertive action through 
non-hierarchical cooperation, leads to the rediscovery of old ideas for 
envisaging and organizing spaces that are governed by freedom and liberty. 
It is difficult to find power structures when “Human beings, the 
fundamental building blocks, group together at will with the other building 
blocks of ever-changing humanity” (Reclus 1905, p. III). 
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